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Falzone: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost

NOTES
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:

A PLEA BARGAIN LOST
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the controversial moral and legal issues presented when
ineffective assistance of counsel occurs at the plea bargaining stage of a criminal
prosecution. Specifically, this Note focuses on the situation where a criminal
defendant lost an opportunity to accept a pre-trial plea bargain offer, due solely to
defense counsel's negligence, and later, after a fair trial and a conviction, received
a more severe sentence than the sentence contemplated by the lost plea bargain.
Two central questions are presented in these situations and addressed in this Note.
First, has such a defendant been constitutionally harmed by the loss of the plea
bargain? Second, what if any is the appropriate remedy in these cases? This Note
concludes that while the law in California is presently unsettled in this area, the
United States Constitution, as well as the rulings from various state and federal
courts, suggests that such a defendant has indeed been constitutionally harmed, and
the only remedy which will adequately compensate the defendant for this injury is
the forced reinstatement of the lost plea bargain.

INTRODUCTION
Pat is arrestedand charged with committing a crime. Before the trial begins, the
government offers aplea bargainto Pat'sattorney. Unfortunately, either the attorney
does not tell Pat about the offer at all, or perhaps gives Pat the wrong information
about the terms of the offer. Pat then proceeds to trial after either rejecting the
miscommunicated offer or after the time to accept it has passed without Pat's
knowledge. After afair trialPatis convicted. Later, Patdiscovers that the lostplea
bargain would have provided a lighter sentence than the sentence actually imposed.
Pat appeals.

This has not happened only to Pat. It has happened to many people
throughout California and the United States and it is likely to continue to
occur. Situations like this require a court to answer some very difficult
questions: By what standard should the court judge the adequacy of
counsel's performance at the plea bargaining stage? Has the legal representation been so inadequate as to effectively deny the defendants their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel? What remedy, if any, is appropriate?
The answers to these questions may be considered by examining two
recent decisions handed down simultaneously by separate panels of the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District: In re Alvernaz1 and
People v. Pollard.2 These two cases presented nearly identical fact patterns.

Each involved a claim by the defendant that the ineffective assistance of

1. 282 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), cert. granted, 818 P.2d 61 (Cal. Oct. 17, 1991).
2. 282 Cal. Rptr. 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), cert. granted, 818 P.2d 61 (Cal. Oct. 17, 1991).
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counsel had caused the defendant to reject a plea bargain offer. Both
defendants received fair trials and both were sentenced more severely than
they would have been under the terms of the offered plea bargains. In ruling
on the cases, both panels applied the test established by the Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington? Nonetheless, the panels arrived at opposite
conclusions as to the same issues of law. The Alvernaz court ruled that
counsel's failings had not led to a constitutionally significant harm because
the defendant had received a fair trial. 4 In contrast, the Pollardcourt ruled
that if the counsel had acted as alleged by the defendant, the defendant would
have been constitutionally harmed by counsel's failings regardless of the fair
trial.5 These two inconsistent rulings typify the conflict which has existed
since the issue was first addressed by the courts.
To explore the issues underlying this conflict, this Note first will
consider the behavior that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and
will trace the previous California cases which have involved claims of
ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining stage. Then, this Note will
compare and contrast the application of the Stricklandtest in Pollardand in
Alvernaz, as well as in cases from other jurisdictions. Next, the dilemma
regarding the appropriate remedy for a defendant that has lost the benefit of
a plea bargain due to ineffective assistance of counsel will be examined.
Finally, this Note will argue that, while the case law in California is
presently unsettled, the rulings from the various state and federal courts
which have addressed this issue suggest that the outcome reached in Pollard
should be favored over the outcome reached in Alvernaz.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
For many years the courts throughout the country were unable to

generate a uniform test for judging the adequacy of counsel's performance
in criminal cases. 6 Then, in 1984, the United States Supreme Court
established the current federal test for judging the adequacy of representation
by counsel in criminal proceedings in the landmark case of Strickland v.
Washington.7 Shortly after this case was decided, most states, including

3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
5. Pollard, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
6. Multiple standards had emerged, but none gained universal support. E.g., Gillihan v.
Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1977) (granting relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel only when the trial was a farce, a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience
of the reviewing court); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) (replacing
'sham' or 'mockery' test with a 'reasonably competent assistance standard'); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3rd Cir. 1970) (standard is whether attorney exercised the customary
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place).
7. 466 U.S. 668.
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California, adopted Strickland's "two-prong" test,' and today the analysis
of any ineffective assistance of counsel claim invariably begins with an
examination of Strickland.
In Strickland, the Court held that when a defendant claims counsel's
performance was constitutionally ineffective, the defendant must establish that
(1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.'

These two prongs establish both an objective and

a subjective standard. In order to meet prong one, the objective standard,
a defendant must identify the acts or omissions which are alleged to have
been professionally unreasonable (i.e., outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance).1" In order to meet prong two, the subjective
standard, a defendant must convince the court that there is a reasonable
probability that but-for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." If both prongs of this test are
satisfied, then it is clear the defendant has been denied the effective
assistance of counsel which is guaranteed to every criminal defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.12

In Strickland, the Court used the test to judge the attorney's performance
at a capital sentencing hearing. 3 With time, however, the test has been
applied to other crucial stages in the proceedings. In one such decision, the

8. Browning v. State, 465 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Wilson v. State, 711
P.2d 547, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Meeker, 693 P.2d 911, 914 (Ariz. 1984); Cavin
v. State, 681 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Ark. 1984); People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1987);
Banks v. People, 696 P.2d 293, 298 (Colo. 1985); Miller v. Angliker, 494 A.2d 1226, 1234
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988); Curry v. United States,
498 A.2d 534, 539 (D.C. 1985); Smith v. State, 457 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 1984); Komegay
v. State, 329 S.E.2d 601, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Davis v. State, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1989); People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Il. 1989); Bevill v. State, 472 N.E.2d
1247, 1251 (Ind. 1985); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984);
Chamberlain v. State, 694 P.2d 468,471 (Kan. 1985); Brewster v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.2d
863, 864 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Teeter, 504 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506, 508 (Md. 1988); Commonwealth v. Rossi, 473 N.E.2d 708, 711
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985); People v. Vicuna, 367 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985);
Lambert v. State, 462 So. 2d 308, 316 (Miss. 1984); Cornman v. State, 779 S.W.2d 17, 18
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Mont. 1990); State v. Jones, 432
N.W.2d 523, 527 (Neb. 1988); Wilson v. State, 771 P.2d 583, 584 (Nev. 1989); People v.
Ploss, 105 A.D.2d 1031, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 506
(N.C. 1985); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 231 (N.D. 1985); State v. Bradley, 538
N.E.2d 373, 379 (Ohio 1989); Commonwealth v. Brown, 486 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984); Clark v. Ellerthorpe, 552 A.2d 1186, 1188 (R.I. 1989); Butler v. State, 334 S.E.2d 813,
814 (S.C. 1985); State v. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d 1, 12 (S.D. 1985); Hanzelka v. State, 682
S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Perry v. Warden of Mecklenburg Correctional Center,
332 S.E.2d 791, 792 (Va. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816, 817 (Wash. 1987);
State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Wis. 1986); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo.
1987).
9. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
10. Id. at 690.
11. Id. at 694.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
13. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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Supreme Court expanded the Strickland test by applying it to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea bargaining process.14
Three years after Strickland, the Supreme Court of California reevaluated the state's rules for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel." In

People v. Ledesma,' 6 the court adopted the Strickland test, reiterating
virtually all of the language found in the Strickland opinion. Specifically, the
court quoted Strickland in regard to how a defendant can satisfy each prong
of the test. 7 More interestingly, however, the Ledesma court agreed with
the Supreme Court that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel exists to protect the accused's fundamental right to a fair and reliable
trial.18 This language has fueled much of the controversy upon which this
Note focuses.
Since Ledesma was decided, the California courts have uniformly applied
the two-prong test to cases where attorney error at the plea bargaining stage
led to the loss of an offered plea bargain. 9 Application of the test,
however, has failed to generate uniform results in two distinct and important
areas. The first area involves the interpretation of the Strickland definition
of "prejudice," and the second deals with the remedy which should be
granted to the accused in these cases?0
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT THE PLEA
BARGAIN STAGE IN CALIFORNIA

Can ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage amount

14. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
15. Before Strickland, the standard in California for assessing the adequacy of counsel was set
forth in People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1963). In lbarra,the court ruled that a defendant
could establish ineffective assistance by showing that counsel's error was so extreme as to
transform the trial into a "farce or sham." Id. at 490. This standard was rejected after a decade
and a half as too vague and subjective. People v. Pope, 590 P.2d 859, 865 (Cal. 1979). In
Pope, the court applied a two part test for establishing that counsel was ineffective. The Pope
court ruled that the defendant must first establish that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 866. Then, the defendant must establish that
counsel's errors "resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense." Id.
Later, the Supreme Court of California articulated a second test for judging the adequacy
of counsel in cases where the alleged error did not amount to the loss of an actual defense. In
People v. Fosselman, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Cal. 1983), the court ruled that in such cases the
defendant must meet a two part test slightly different from that in Pope. The first part did not
substantially differ from the first part of the Pope test. To meet the second part, however, the
defendant had to show prejudice as a result of counsel's errors by proving that, in the absence
of the errors, it is reasonably probable that a determination more favorable to the accused would
have resulted. Id.
16. Ledesma, 729 P.2d at 866.
17. Id. at 866-69.
18. Id. at 866.
19. People v. Bennett, 248 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (Ordered not published
Pursuant to Rule 976 Cal. Rules of Ct.); Alvemaz 282 Cal. Rptr. 601; Pollard, 282 Cal. Rptr.
588.
20. These issues are discussed infra in Sections III.B. and IV, respectively.
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to a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel? The early
California case law in this area involved situations where a defendant had
accepted, rather than rejected, a plea bargain because of counsel's errors. 21
In those cases, the answer to the question was clearly "yes." In People v.

McCary, for example, the defendant was charged with several crimes and
a serious felony enhancement.' During plea negotiations, the state offered
the defendant the opportunity for a dismissal of the serious felony enhancement in exchange for a guilty plea on the remainder of the charges.2' Based
on defense counsel's recommendation, the defendant accepted the plea
bargain.' In making that recommendation, defense counsel was not aware,
however, that the defendant was not legally subject to the serious felony
enhancement.' Accordingly, the offer to dismiss it was of no real value
and the plea bargain should not have been accepted. The defendant did not
learn of this error, however, until the Third District brought it to his
attention when he appealed on other grounds.'
In rendering its decision, the McCary court established a new test for
claims of ineffective assistance at the plea bargain stage.' The court held
that in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining,
the defendant must show that counsel's acts or omissions adversely affected
the defendant's ability to knowingly and voluntarily decide to enter a plea of
guilty.29
The McCary test, however, is not applicable to all cases where there is
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining. In McCary,
the court conducted only a limited analysis, focusing solely on whether
counsel's advice was deficient.' Having determined that it was indeed
deficient, the court perfunctorily determined that the defendant had suffered
prejudice by erroneously waiving his right to receive a trial." The obvious

21. In re Hawley, 433 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1967); In re Williams, 460 P.2d 984 (Cal. 1969);
People v. Stanworth, 522 P.2d 1058 (Cal. 1974); People v. McCary, 212 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal.
1985).
22. 212 Cal. Rptr. 114.
23. Id.at 116.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. As part of Proposition 8, adopted in California on June 8, 1982, the serious felony
enhancement which McCary was charged with was inapplicable to offenses occurring prior to
that date. McCary was charged with offenses which occurred before that date, thus, he was
improperly charged with the serious felony enhancement. Id. at 117.

27. Id.at 116.
28. The McCary court noted that the Pope and Fosselman tests were not appropriate for the

facts before it. Id. at 119. Although Strickland was decided in 1984, one year before McCary,
the McCary court failed to mention the Strickland test, and instead applied only the California
tests in existence at that time. This may be due to the fact that the Supreme Court of California

still had yet to expressly adopt the Strickland test in Ledesma.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 120.
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prejudice suffered by an accused who erroneously waives the fundamental
right to a trial and thus, all of its inherent protections, explains why the
McCary test did not need to focus on prejudice. In contrast, in cases like
Alvernaz and Pollardthe prejudice is not as clear. In those cases, counsel's
error has not deprived the accused of the fundamental right to receive a trial;
rather, counsel's error has caused the accused to exercise that very right.
For this reason, the narrow McCary test has been of negligible use to courts
which have been faced with an Alvernaz or Pollardtype of situation.
The first time a California court was confronted with a case where
counsel's failings led a defendant to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial
was in People v. Brown. 2 In Brown, the defendant was charged with
several serious offenses. 3 During plea negotiations, the defense attorney
failed to correct a mistake appearing in a "pre-plea report."' As a result,
the plea bargain offered a much stiffer sentence than would otherwise have
been offered, the plea bargain was not completed, and the defendant
proceeded to trial .' At trial the defendant was convicted on several serious
charges and received a heavier sentence than he would have received under
the plea bargain.' The defendant appealed, alleging that the attorney's
failure to correct the errors in the pre-plea report constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.37
The Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the defendant's conviction. 38 The court initially stated that a defendant is entitled to effective
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage and a deficiency in that
assistance might be considered reversible error.39 The court then directed
that the focus in these cases should be on whether counsel's failings resulted
in a lost opportunity for the defendant to present a plea bargain to the

32. 223 Cal. Rptr. 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
33. Id. at 67.
34. In a pre-plea report, a probation officer inquires into the type and circumstances of the
offense committed as well as the defendant's character, history, and family environment, in
order to arrive at a recommendation for or against release of the defendant on probation. CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 131.3 (Deering 1991). That report was to be used by the parties in order
to assess the value of a plea bargain which had been offered by the district attorney. Brown,
223 Cal. Rptr. at 68. In Brown, the district attorney and the defense attorney had agreed that
the pre-plea report should assess the possibility for probation if the defendant was to accept the
state's offer to plead guilty to a single charge only. Id. at 69-70. The district attorney had
promised that if the report recommended probation, and the judge was inclined to grant it, the
istrict attorney would neither recommend nor oppose that disposition. When the report was
prepared, however, it mistakenly assumed a plea of guilty to several serious charges. Id.
Although realizing this error, the defense attorney made no effort to have the report corrected,
and as a result the report recommended a prison commitment without probation. Id.
Accordingly, the plea agreement was never reached. Id.
35. Id. at 67.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 68.
38. Id. at 79.
39. Id. at 70.
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court,' To establish reversible error, the Brown court advanced a test
similar to the Strickland test. Succinctly stated, under Brown the defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel's acts or
omissions fell below the standard of reasonable diligence; (2) absent those
acts or omissions it would be reasonably probable that a plea bargain, which
the defendant was prepared to accept, would have been presented to the court
for its approval or rejection; and (3) the rejected plea bargain would have
been more lenient than the sentence actually received.41
Applying this standard, the Brown court ruled that although the
defendant had proved counsel's assistance was deficient, he had failed to
prove that, absent counsel's errors, a plea bargain would have been presented
to the court for its approval or rejection, and thus the defendant had not
established prejudice.42 The court also ruled that prejudice was lacking
because by agreeing only to not oppose the defendant's request for probation,
the district attorney had never actually agreed to the plea bargain.43
Finally, the court stated that even if the district attorney had expressly agreed
to the plea bargain, the existing case law prohibited the court from accepting
such a plea anyway." In light of these considerations, the court affirmed
the defendant's conviction.45
Although Brown involved the same issues addressed in this Note,
Brown's test has not been applied in all later cases. In Alvernaz, for
example, the court stated that because the Brown court ultimately ruled that
there was no resulting prejudice under the facts before it, the Brown test
cannot be controlling in cases where the attorney's error had caused a
defendant to reject the plea bargain offer.'
Prior to Alvernaz and Pollard, only one other California case involved
ineffective assistance leading to a rejected plea bargain. In People v.

40. Id. at 76.
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id.at 79.
43. Id. After the district attorney had offered the defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to

one count only, the defendant sought the additional promise that he would not be sentenced to
confinement in state prison. Id.The defendant wanted to receive probation with not more than
one year in the county jail as a condition. Id. This counter offer led to the preparation of the
pre-plea report, and the district attorney's promise not to oppose probation if it was recommended by the report. Id.
44. Id. The court stated that even if the defendant had entered a plea pursuant to the
prosecutor's offer (i.e., guilty to one count only, with no opposition by the district attorney as
to sentencing), the court still could have sentenced the defendant to a prison term longer than

the one year sentence which the defendant desired. It was apparently this possibility which
caused the court to find no prejudice. Note, however, that a court is never obligated to accept
a plea bargain which the prosecutor and defendant have agreed upon. Thus, if taken literally,

the Brown court's reasoning for a finding of no prejudice would indicate that a defendant in
Brown's position could never establish prejudice; the possibility that the court would not have

accepted the offered plea bargain will exist in every case.
45. Id.
46. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 608. But see Pollard, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (holding that
Brown is applicable). See also infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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Bennett,47 the California Court of Appeal, Fifth District, reached a decision
which foreshadowed the Fourth District's ruling in Alvernaz. Significantly,
however, the Bennett opinion was de-published by the California Supreme
Court shortly after it was decided, and thus, the Alvernaz court was not
permitted to cite to it as precedent for its decision.' It was against this
backdrop of scarce case law that the conflict between Alvernaz and Pollard
arose.
III. THE PRESENT CONFLICT: ALVERWAZ AND POLLARD

In Alvernaz, the defendant was charged with two counts of robbery, and
one count each of burglary and kidnapping, plus a weapons enhancement.49
Prior to his trial, the district attorney offered Alvernaz the opportunity to
plead guilty to one count of robbery with the weapons enhancement.' ° If
accepted, this offer would have resulted in a maximum of five years of
incarceration. Alvernaz' counsel erroneously advised him that should he be
convicted at trial, he would face a maximum of only eight years of imprisonment. Due to this small disparity in jail time, Alvernaz elected to take his
chances and go to trial.51 He rejected the plea bargain, and after receiving
a fair trial, was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. He then appealed
on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 5
47. Bennett, 248 Cal. Rptr. 767.
48. Rule 977 of the California Rules of Court states that an opinion which is not published,
or one which is ordered de-published by the Supreme Court of California (under Rule 976),
cannot be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any subsequent case. CAL. R. CT. Rules
976-977.
In Bennett, the defendant had rejected a plea bargain offer during pre-trial plea bargaining
based on erroneous advice from his attorney. Bennett, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 768. That plea bargain
would have resulted in a less severe sentence than he actually received, so Bennett appealed his
conviction claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The Fifth District affirmed Bennett's
conviction, relying heavily on the fact that both Strickland and Ledesma had stated that the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure the defendant a "fair trial." Id. at 771. The
Bennett court stated that a "fair trial" is one where the reviewing court has confidence in the
ultimate outcome which was reached. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the only attorney
errors which can render a trial unfair are those which affect the reliability of the trial court's
findings of fact or law. Id. This reasoning was apparent in the court's application of the
Strickland test in its original form. Id. at 772. The court then went on to state that the
prejudice prong of the test can only be met if the defendant establishes that the attorney error
interfered with the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 771. Since Bennett had admittedly
received a fair trial, the court ruled that prejudice was lacking and affirmed the conviction. Id.
at 778.
In so doing the Bennett court held that Brown did not apply. The court stated that since
the Brown court misapplied Strickland, its conclusion was in error. Id. at 775. Specifically,
according to Bennett, the Brown court's mistake was that it had failed to consider whether
counsel's error had any relation to the "purpose" behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Id. Thus, Bennett rejected Brown because Brown did not agree that the only purpose behind the
right to counsel is the guarantee of a fair trial.
49. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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53 the defendant was charged with four separate counts
In Pollard,
relating to the cultivation and possession of marijuana for sale.' Before
trial, the prosecutor told Pollard's attorney the state would accept a guilty
plea to one count of cultivation of marijuana and the count would be lowered
to a misdemeanor at the end of eighteen months probation. 5 Pollard's
attorney failed to communicate this offer to Pollard, and accordingly, he
opted for a trial.' After a fair trial was conducted, Pollard was convicted
of all counts and was sentenced to three years probation on the condition that
he serve ninety days in custody. 7 He then appealed on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 8

A. Deficient Performance of Counsel
The first prong of the two-prong Strickland test requires a defendant to
establish that counsel's performance was deficient.P In order to meet this
objective standard, the defendant must identify the acts or omissions that are
alleged to have been the result of unreasonable and unprofessional judgment.'
In Alvernaz, the court did not elaborate on what the defendant needed to
prove in order to meet the first prong of the Strickland test. The court did
state, however, that counsel has a duty to investigate and determine all
defenses available to the client and to inform the client of all the applicable
statutory penalties. In this case, the attorney's failure to provide Alvernaz
with accurate advice about the potential sentence he could face constituted
deficient performance. Hence, the Alvernaz court ruled that the first prong
of the Strickland test was met.6'
Unlike the Alvernaz court, the Pollardcourt expressly stated what the
defendant must do to meet the first prong of the Strickland test. To
demonstrate deficient performance of counsel, the defendant must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel failed to communicate an
offered plea bargain, or that counsel misstated some aspect of the law which

53. 282 Cal. Rptr. 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
54. Id. at 590.
55. Id. at 591.
56. Id. Pollard claimed that the only offer communicated by his attorney was that the state
was willing to accept his plea of guilty to two felony drug counts. Pollard stated that initially
he told his attorney that he was unwilling to plead guilty to those two felonies. Later, however,

Pollard claimed that he notified his attorney that he had changed his mind and would accept the
offer. At that time, the attorney told Pollard that he should go to trial instead of accepting the

plea bargain, because the two felonies could eventually be reduced to misdemeanors even after
a conviction. This advice led Pollard to go to trial. Id.
57. Id. at 600-01.
58. Id. at 590.
59. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

60. Id. at 690.
61. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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was important to an intelligent evaluation of the offer. 2 Since the record
was insufficient with regard to counsel's conduct, the Pollardcourt remanded
the case and directed the lower court to develop the record in this area.61
After basically agreeing as to the proper application of the first prong of the
Strickland test, the courts turned to the second prong of the test.
B. Prejudice
In Strickland, the Court stated that, "an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."' Thus,
once the defendant shows that counsel made an unprofessional error, in order
to prevail on appeal, the defendant must also establish that he or she was
prejudiced by that error. This notion of prejudice is at the heart of the
conflict between Alvernaz and Pollard.
As discussed in the preceding section, Alvernaz and Pollard agreed on
the application of the first prong of the Strickland test. When the courts
turned to the second prong of the test, however, a substantial conflict arose.
Alvernaz ruled that errors by counsel during plea bargaining are harmless
unless they have an impact on the trial, while Pollard applied the same
Strickland test and ruled that those same errors are reversible if they led to
a lost plea bargain opportunity. This distinction will be discussed in the two
sections which follow.
1. In re Alvernaz: Harmless Error. In Alvernaz, the court ruled that
Alvernaz's conviction should be affirmed because he failed to meet the
second prong of the Strickland test."
The cornerstone of the Alvernaz decision was the court's interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. The court declared
that counsel's purpose is to aid the defendant in receiving the constitutional
and statutory protections which must be provided to any person who is
accused of a crime.' The court stated that those protections prevent the
accused from being wrongfully convicted and that the individual protections
have all been combined to form our basic trial process.67 Thus, according

62. Pollard,282 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
63. Id. at 598.
64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
65. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 614. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the situation
at hand did not fit into either the Pope or Fosselman tests for prejudice. Id. at 612. The Pope
test was not applicable because there had not been a withdrawal of a potentially meritorious
defense. Id. The Fosseinan test also did not apply because counsel's error had not deprived
the defendant of any advantage which he was constitutionally entitled to, nor did it effect the
basic trial processes. Id. Also note that the Alvernaz rationale is remarkably similar to that of
the depublished Bennett opinion.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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to Alvernaz, errors by counsel which undermine the basic trial process itself
will be the only grounds for a reversal and a new trial due to ineffective
assistance of counsel.'
As an example of the type of error which undermines the trial process
itself, the court pointed to the situation in McCary where the defendant pled
guilty based on ineffective advice from his attorney, and therefore, never
received a trial at all.' The Alvernaz court reasoned that in McCary,
counsel's errors obviously undermined the basic trial process by causing the
trial to not occur.' The Alvernaz court noted the sacrifice of a trial, and
all of the procedural safeguards which it includes, was clearly prejudicial to
a person accused of a crime. 7 Returning to the facts before it, the Alvernaz
court stated that in order to establish the requisite prejudice, Alvernaz would
have had to show that counsel's error had an impact on the trial in which he
was convicted.' Since Alvernaz had admittedly received a fair trial, the
court ruled that counsel's failings were merely harmless error and affirmed
the conviction.'
As previously stated, Brown74 was the only existing published California case which was on point at the time that Alvernaz and Pollard were
decided. The Alvernaz court, however, distinguished Brown and refused to
treat it as precedent. 5 Justice Froehlich, writing for the Alvernaz majority,
stated that had the court applied Brown to the facts in Alvernaz, it would
have been required to reverse the defendant's conviction." Under the
Brown test, Alvernaz was prejudiced because (1) his attorney's inaccurate
advice fell below the standard of reasonable diligence, (2) he would have
accepted the plea offer and submitted it to the court for its approval if his
attorney had given him correct sentencing information, and (3) the life
sentence he received was more severe than the five year term he would have
received under the plea bargain. But, since the Alvernaz court was unwilling
to apply Brown, it was not bound to this outcome.
The court offered two reasons for its dismissal of Brown. First, the
court stated that "[because] the test outlined by the [Brown] court to
determine prejudice was used to reach a conclusion of no prejudice... the

68. Id.
69. Id. For full discussion of McCary, see supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
70. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Brown, 233 Cal. Rptr. 66.
75. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 608. Since Alvernaz and Brown were decided by equal levels
of the California Appellate Courts (i.e., Brown was decided by the Third District, and Alvernaz
was decided by the Fourth District) the Alvernaz court was not bound by the ruling of the Brown
court. Thus, Brown is considered persuasive but not mandatory authority among the other
California District Courts of Appeal. In Alvernaz, however, the court did not point to this as
part of its reasoning for not applying Brown.
76. Id.
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case is therefore not precedent for reversing a jury verdict of guilty following
an aborted plea bargain negotiation."' Secondly, Alvernaz stated that the
remedy suggested in Brown75 was not appropriate in most cases. 79 Thus,
the Alvernaz court refused to apply the Brown test,' and ruled that the
defendant had not suffered legal prejudice."'
To date, only Alvernaz (and the de-published Bennett case) stand for the
proposition that constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel which leads
to the forfeiture of a favorable plea bargain is not prejudicial under
Strickland. The basis for this position is the argument that by receiving a
fair trial after counsel has made the error at the plea stage, the defendant has
still received full Constitutional protection. But what value is the
"protection" afforded by a fair trial to an accused who might not have even
faced that trial in the first place? A showing by the accused that but-for
counsel's error the plea bargain would have been accepted, necessarily means
the trial would not have occurred in the absence of that error. Participation
in a trial is prejudicial in and of itself when compared to the alternative of
entering a plea bargain. This is so because the procedural protection
contained in a fair trial cannot possibly equal the amount of protection which
an accused would receive by not having to participate in the trial at all. That
is what Alvernaz has missed by concluding the protection received at a fair
trial nullifies the prejudice caused by losing the opportunity to accept a
beneficial plea bargain.
The prejudice ruling reached in Alvernaz appears to be caused by the
conflict surrounding the remedy issue in this type of case.' Both courts

77. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
78. In Brown, the court ruled that the defendant had failed to make his requisite showing of
prejudice, and thus, it affirmed his conviction. In a footnote at the end of the opinion, however,
the court stated that had the defendant met his burden of proof, the only remedy the court could
offer would be a reversal and a remand for a new trial. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
79. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
80. The Alvernaz court did not elaborate on its decision to treat the Brown test in this manner
beyond the two rather unclear reasons set out in the text. One possible explanation for this
treatment of the Brown test can be found in the majority's admission that if it were to apply that
test the court would be required to reverse Alvemaz's conviction. Id. The fact that such an
outcome was clearly unsatisfactory to the Alvernaz court may explain the court's perfunctory
dismissal of the Brown test.
81. In Alvernaz, the court created an important distinction between "legal" prejudice and
"actual" prejudice. The court presumed that Alvemaz had been "actually" prejudiced because
he had proven that he would have accepted the plea bargain in the absence of counsel's errors.
Id. at 604-05. However, the court did not feel that the prejudice inquiry should end there.
Instead, the court went on to rule that Alvemaz was not "legally" prejudiced because his
participation in a fair trial mooted the "actual" prejudice that he had suffered from the lost plea
bargain. Id. at 614. The distinction between "legal" and "actual" prejudice has never before
been made in cases centering on ineffective assistance of counsel, and it does not appear to fit
into the Strickland test in any way. Moreover, the Alvernaz determination of "actual" prejudice
fully satisfies the prejudice requirement of the Strickland test. Proof that but-for the error,
Alvemaz would have accepted the plea bargain would constitute a showing that the result of the
proceeding would have been different, because a plea of guilty to a lesser offense is surely a
"different outcome" than a conviction of a more serious offense.
82. The remedy issues are discussed infra in Section IV.
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wrote extensively on the remedy issue, and it can be argued that the lack of
an "acceptable" remedy caused the courts to rule that the respective
defendants had suffered no prejudice. In Alvernaz, for example, the court
inexplicably drifted into a discussion of remedy in the portion of the opinion
where it claimed to be looking to other jurisdictions for a prejudice test.?
This suggests the court linked its prejudice decision with its remedy decision.
After outlining the case law from other jurisdictions, and finding there was
no single remedy advanced by all courts, the Alvernaz court returned to its
prejudice analysis and ruled that there was no prejudice in the case before
it." Accordingly, the atypical decision reached in Alvernaz may be the
product of backward reasoning which looked to the remedy first and then
decided the case in a way that would avoid the logical and moral dilemma
involved in overturning a valid conviction and letting a presumably guilty
defendant receive a lighter sentence.
As the Alvernaz court openly admitted, there is no persuasive authority
from any other jurisdiction supporting the affirmance of a conviction where
constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel cost the defendant an
opportunity to enter a favorable plea.' Thus, its ruling is supported only
by dicta and weak inferences. In an attempt to garner support for its
position, the Alvernaz court relied most heavily on the language found in
Stricklandand Ledesma. Specifically, both Stricklandand Ledesma state that
the purpose of counsel's obligations under the Sixth Amendment is to ensure
criminal defendants receive a fair trial." This language was crucial to the
Alvernaz court's decision that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were
not violated.8 7

83. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 608-11.
84. Id. at 614. Likewise in Bennett, while discussing the defendant's argument that he had
been prejudiced by counsel's errors and thus should be given a new trial or a chance to accept

the original plea bargain, the court stated that, "[it strains the fabric of the system to accept as
reasonable or logical the argument that a defendant who has had his day in court has a

constitutional right to a windfall."

Bennett, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 777. In the very next sentence

the court stated that since the defendant had received his day in court, he was not prejudiced by

the lost opportunity to accept the plea bargain. Id. at 777-78. This order of reasoning indicates
that the Bennett court, like the Alvernaz court, somehow linked its prejudice determination with
the outcome that the defendant was seeking.

85. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
86. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87; Ledesma, 729 P.2d at 866.
87. The language in Strickland is a weak inference for two reasons. First, the language
regarding the "purpose" of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is not

central to the Court's decision in Strickland. The Supreme Court's purpose in Strickland was
to establish a framework for evaluating whether a defendant has received effective counsel. The
Court was not engaged in rendering a simple interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Therefore,

the Court could not have envisioned that its statements regarding the so-called "purpose" of the
amendment would become the basis for a later decision that claimed to have interpreted the tre
reason for the Sixth Amendment.

Secondly, the Strickland opinion is internally inconsistent

when it comes to identifying the "purpose" behind the Amendment. The section which the
Alvernaz court relied upon is just one of the several instances where the Court made a statement
as to the purpose of the Sixth Amendment. Later in the opinion, for example, the Court stated

that, "[the Amendment] envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarialsystem to produce just results." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added). If
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The Alvernaz rationale is also bolstered by dicta from the Iowa Supreme
Court.88 In State v. Kraus, that court affirmed the defendant's conviction
even though he had received ineffective assistance of counsel which led him
to reject a plea bargain." In reaching this decision, the Kraus court was
similarly concerned with the inappropriateness of reversing a fair trial, and
accordingly, failed to find prejudice.'
Additionally, Alvernaz referred to dicta from Williams v. Arn9 ' to
support its position further. In Williams, the defendant alleged that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had failed to
communicate a plea bargain offer to him.' Although stating that such a
failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the Williams court
ultimately ruled that prejudice was lacking because the offer was conditional
and had been withdrawn before the trial.'o The language relied upon by
Alvernaz indicated that the Williams court was unwilling to reverse a fair trial
or allow the defendant to accept the original offer after he was rightfully
convicted.' But, as the Alvernaz court conceded, this language carries little
weight since the Ohio court did not depend on this reasoning in deciding Williams.95
In sum, the position taken by Alvernaz in regard to prejudice does not
find sufficient solid support in the existing case law. While it did point to
several instances where other courts seemed reluctant to find prejudice in
similar cases, the Alvernaz court could not garner the type or quantity of
Alvernaz was correct in its assumption of the purpose behind the amendment, clearly the
Supreme Court would have used the word "trial" in place of the words "adversarial system."
It is these inconsistencies, in combination with the fact that the Supreme Court's sole purpose
in Strickland was to promulgate a standard for judging Sixth Amendment violations, which
compel the conclusion that they relied upon language that can provide nothing more than weak
support for the Alvernaz decision.
88. State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1986).
89. Id. at 672. The Kraus court ultimately reversed the conviction, but the reversal was not
based on the attorney's errors. The court reversed the conviction because the trial court had
given the defendant "enthusiastic encouragement" to plead not guilty, in addition to conflicting
and misleading advice regarding the plea.
90. Id. at 674.
91. 654 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
92. Id. at 233.
93. Id. at 237. In Williams, the defendant was charged with aggravated murder and aggravated
robbery. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the Williams court found that one month before
the trial date, the prosecuting attorney told counsel for the defense that the state would accept
a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, and in return the state would nolle the aggravated murder
charge. Id. at 235. Defense counsel did not, however, tell the defendant about the offer, and
did not communicate further with the prosecuting attorney until the day of the trial. Id. At that
time, the defense counsel asked the prosecutor if the offer still stood, and the prosecutor replied
that it did not. Id. Thus, the Williams court ruled that the offer was conditional and had been
withdrawn during the conversation between the prosecutor and the defense counsel on the day
of the trial. Id.
94. "The remedy of granting the defendant a new trial or ... permitting him to enter a guilty
plea on the basis of the uncommunicated offer ... is an anomaly where the defendant is
subsequently convicted in a fair trial.. ." Id. at 236-37.
95. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.9.
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support which, as the next section will show, presently exists for the Pollard
approach to prejudice.
2. People v. Pollard: Reversible Error. When the Pollard court
addressed the prejudice issue, it stated that the Strickland test, in its original
form, was not perfectly adapted to ineffective assistance claims in the
rejected plea context.' Accordingly, the court made some minor adjustments to the second prong of the test. The court stated that in order to
establish the required prejudice, the defendant must show that but for
counsel's failure to convey the offer, or counsel's erroneous advice
concerning the law or the plea, it is reasonably probable that the defendant
would have accepted the offer.' As previously mentioned, the Pollard
court did not decide whether the test had been met in that case." Rather,
it remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the test to
the facts of the case.'
In reaching its conclusions, Pollard rejected the test articulated in
Brown, but not for the same reasons it was rejected by Alvernaz.'" The
Pollard court stated that the Brown prejudice test was more complex than
necessary to judge the simpler cases where counsel failed to convey a plea
bargain offer, or gave erroneous advice which led to the rejection of the
offer.'' The court noted the complexity of the Brown test was most likely
a product of the unusual fact situation which was before that court."°
Since the Brown test was inappropriate, the Pollard court looked to
Strickland and Ledesma to fashion an appropriate test for prejudice."°
Since Strickland was decided, the majority of courts facing cases like
Pollardand Alvernaz have decided the prejudice issue in a manner consistent
This
with Pollard. One notable decision is Turner v. Tennessee."
decision is important because the legal analysis employed by the court in
Turner is nearly identical to that employed in Pollardand because the Turner
opinion may provide the best indication of how the United States Supreme
Court will rule when it decides cases like Pollardand Alvernaz.
In Turner, the defendant was charged with felony murder and two counts
of kidnapping." In the week before his trial, the state offered Turner a

96. Pollard,282 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
97. Id.
98. See supra footnote 63 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 598.
100. Id. at 593. For discussion of Brown, see supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
103. Pollard,282 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
104. 664 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated,
492 U.S. 902 (1989), remanded to 883 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1989), remanded to 726 F. Supp. 113
(M.D. Tenn. 1989), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 915 (1992).
105. Id. at 1114.
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plea bargain which included a two-year sentence."°6 Relying on the
constitutionally deficient advice of his attorney, Turner rejected the plea
bargain, and proceeded to trial." °7 At trial he was convicted on all counts
and received a life sentence plus two forty year terms to run concurrently. 0' Turner appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.1o9

The Turner court held that the attorney's performance was outside of the
bounds of reasonableness established by prevailing professional norms. 10
When it moved onto the second prong of the Strickland test, the court held
that Turner had been prejudiced by the incompetent advice in that he
probably would have accepted the plea offer if he had received adequate
advice.' This reasoning closely resembles that of the Pollardcourt. This
fact is of particular importance because of the procedural history of the
Turner case. The cited Turner opinion was just one in a long series which
have been published as that case has worked its way up and down the federal
court system.1 2 At one point, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the case," 3 but, as Justice Work noted in his Alvernaz
concurrence, having the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court did not
question the Turner court's ruling in regard to the proper application of
Strickland."4 Rather, it merely remanded the case for further consideration of a recently decided case which dealt only with the proper remedy to
be provided."'
Justice Work reasoned that the Court's treatment of Turner gives rise to
the implication that the United States Supreme Court believes a defendant in
Turner's situation has suffered a constitutionally significant harm, regardless
of the fact that he had received a fair trial." 6 Accordingly, Justice Work
would have agreed with the Pollardcourt's reasoning and ruled that Alvernaz

106. Id.
107. According to the court, the attorney had an inflated estimate of his own abilities, an
unrealistic estimate of the probabilities of outcome at trial, and a casual attitude toward trial
preparation. Additionally, he had used cocaine and consorted with prostitutes around the time
period when the plea bargain was offered. According to the court, these circumstances
contributed to the attorney's erroneous advice that the defendant should reject the offer and go
to trial. Id. at 1115 n.6.
108. Id. at 1114.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 104 (where case history is laid out in full).
113. Turner, 492 U.S. 902.
114. Alvernaz, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
115. Turner, 492 U.S. at 902 (remanded for consideration in light of Alabama v. Smith, 490
U.S. 794 (1989)).
116. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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had satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test.117 If the implication raised
by Justice Work is true, then the Supreme Court would approve of the
prejudice ruling in Pollardand reject the decision in Alvernaz. The Pollard
position was also supported by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Ex
parte Wilson."' In Wilson, the defendant's attorney rejected a plea bargain
offered by the state without telling the defendant about the offer because the
attorney felt he could win the case at trial. 9 Under the terms of the offer,
the defendant would have been sentenced to no more than thirteen years in
prison."2 The defendant, later convicted after a fair trial, was sentenced
to life in prison.'
On appeal, the court applied the Strickland test and
ruled that the defendant had met both prongs. Accordingly, it reversed the
conviction and remanded for a new trial.' " The Wilson court stated that
the requisite prejudice had been established because the defendant testified
that he would have accepted the plea bargain if he had known about it."
This test is similar to the prejudice test advanced by the Pollard court. 4
Additionally, in Lewandowski v. Makel,1 the United States District
Court in Michigan employed a prejudice test which was nearly identical to
the Pollardtest in terms of the type and quantum of proof that a defendant
must show. In Lewandowski, the defendant was charged with first degree
murder." Pursuant to effective advice by his original attorney, the defendant entered into a plea bargain agreement with the state. 27 Under the
terms of the plea bargain, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to
second degree murder and in consideration, he would not be tried for first

117. In his concurrence, Justice Work stated that he agreed with the majority that Alvemaz'
conviction should be affirmed, but he would have reached that decision on a purely factual basis.
Id.at 615-16 (Work, J., concurring). Justice Work noted that Alvemaz was charged with
offenses that fall under California Penal Code Section 1192.7. That section bars the court from
accepting plea bargains to certain specified crimes. Since the crimes charged to Alvernaz were
covered by that statute, Justice Work would have held that Alvemaz suffered no prejudice
because the trial court would have been without discretion to accept the bargain that the state
had offered. Id. at 661-17 (Work, J., concurring). Justice Work went on, however, to disagree
with the majority on the legal issues which are relevant to this Note. Id.at 617-20 (work, J.,
concurring).
118. 724 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
119. Id.at 73.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.See infra Section IV for a discussion of the remedy provided by the Wilson court.
123. Wilson, 724 S.W.2d at 74.
124. The only difference between the two tests is in terms of the quantum of proof that each
requires. In Pollard, the court held that the defendant must show that but for the errors, it is
reasonably probable that the offer would have been accepted. In contrast, less proof was needed
to meet the Wilson test. In Wilson, the defendant's mere testimony that he would have accepted
the offer was sufficient to meet the test. This slight difference is not significant, however, and
as a whole Wilson lends support for the Pollard test.
125. 754 F. Supp. 1142 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
126. Id.at 1144.
127. Id.
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Later, without the advice of counsel, the defendant
degree murder."
attempted to withdraw his plea."2 The trial court refused and sentenced
him to a fifteen to twenty-five year prison term."3 The defendant was then
given improper advice by a new attorney which caused him to appeal the
trial court's ruling and continue his campaign to have the plea withdrawn."' This advice was improper because the attorney failed to inform
the defendant of recent changes in the law which directed that upon voluntary
withdrawal of a plea, the court would remand to trial on the original
charges. 32 The appeal was successful and the defendant was permitted to
withdraw his plea. 33 Subsequently, he was tried and convicted of first
degree murder." The defendant was sentenced to life in prison with no
possibility for parole, and then appealed on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel.135
The Lewandowski court applied both prongs of the Strickland test. In
order to establish prejudice, the court stated that the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the incompetent legal
assistance, he would not have gone to trial on the original charge. 1" This
137
language is nearly identical to that used by the court in Pollard.
Additionally, the Lewandowski court seemed to reject the lower standard of
proof which was accepted by the Wilson court.131 The Lewandowski court
stated that to meet the prejudice test, the defendant must present more than
subjective evidence of intent. 39 The court stated that the defendant must
set forth objective evidence that the outcome would have been different in the

128. Id.
129. Id. Apparently, the defendant had no clear memory of the offense at the time that he
accepted the plea and pled nolo contendere. Later, as his memory returned, he became
convinced of his innocence and sought on his own to have his plea withdrawn. This decision
was not due to ineffective advice from counsel since the attorney was not aware of the
defendant's actions until the day of the first hearing on the issue. At that hearing, the attorney
vehemently objected to the defendant's desire to withdraw the plea, and was given permission
by the court to withdraw from the case. At that time, the case law suggested that the defendant
could not be charged with the original offense of first degree murder upon withdrawal of his
plea. In the months that followed, however, the law changed and the Michigan courts were
given the power to reinstate the original charge where a defendant was allowed to voluntarily
withdraw a previous plea. Id. at 1144-46.
130. Id. at 1144.
131. Id.
132. Id. The proper advice would have been to live with the relatively light sentence he had
received after entering the plea. Therefore, the attorney should have told him not to seek
permission to withdraw the plea of guilty.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1146.
136. Id. at 1148.
137. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
139. Lewandowski, 754 F. Supp. at 1147.
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absence of the errors.140
In sum, authoritative case law from other jurisdictions plainly supports
the Pollardapplication of Strickland, while necessarily rejecting the Alvernaz
approach. The inquiry does not end with the proper application of
Strickland, however, because once a defendant meets the two-prong test the
court is then faced with a most interesting dilemma, determining the proper
remedy for the defendant's injury.
IV.

DETERMINING THE PROPER REMEDY FOR A

LOST PLEA BARGAIN

Perhaps the most heated debate in this area of law has been over the
remedy for a defendant who successfully establishes prejudice. To date, a
uniform remedy has not been endorsed. Even the United States Supreme
Court's landmark Strickland decision, which provides a uniform test for
judging the adequacy of counsel in these types of cases, does not provide
guidance for determining an appropriate remedy. Thus, the courts have been
left on their own. The various options which they have proffered can be
divided into two basic categories. The early decisions granted a new trial to
a defendant who had been harmed in this manner. The trend in the more
recent cases (including Pollard), however, is to reverse the defendant's
conviction and mandate that the prosecutor reinstate the original plea bargain
offer.
A. GrantingA New Trial
The Brown decision marked the first time a California court discussed
the remedy issue in a case where ineffective assistance of counsel led to a
lost opportunity for the defendant to accept a plea bargain.14 ' As previously noted, however, the Brown court ultimately ruled against the defendant,
so its discussion of remedy is only dicta. In a footnote at the end of the
opinion, the court indicated it would have simply remanded the case for a
new trial. 42 The court added, however, that appellate relief is imperfect
because a reversal on appeal does not compel the state to reinstate the plea
bargain, nor can it dictate the sentence which the defendant will receive if he
is convicted at the new trial.143
In the cases outside of California, where the defendant had satisfied both
prongs of the Strickland test, several courts have also ruled that a new trial

140. Id. The Lewandowski court then ruled that the defendant had made a sufficient showing
to satisfy the prejudice test, and ordered that the original conviction and sentence for second

degree murder be reinstated. Id. at 1150. Additionally, the court mandated that the defendant
be freed from confinement immediately, because, under the original sentence, the defendant
should have been paroled by the time that this case was finally decided. Id.

141. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 79 n.25.
142. Id. at 79 n.25.
143. Id.
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was the proper remedy to a defendant harmed in this manner. 144 Unfortunately, the courts did not discuss the reasons for this choice of remedy.
Nonetheless, a second fair trial does not seem to redress the defendant's
injury in any way, because there is no reason to believe that the outcome of
a second fair trial will be different from that of the first. Thus, the time and
expenditures incurred by the state and the defendant if forced to take part in
an unnecessary re-trial makes this remedy unreasonable.
B. Reinstatement Of The OriginalPlea Bargain
A substantial number of courts," 4 including the Pollard court, have
held that the proper remedy in these cases is to reverse the conviction and
order the prosecutor to reinstate the lost plea bargain. The question that
arises, however, concerns the situation where the state refuses to reinstate its
original offer. It is easy to understand that the state would be reluctant to
offer a plea bargain to a person who had been sentenced to a more severe
punishment by a judge or jury. Yet, on the other hand, since the defendant
would have accepted the original bargain in the absence of counsel's errors,
the state would be no worse off than it should have been in the first
place."4 This is a difficult issue, and the resulting split among the courts
in resolving it is not surprising.
Appellate courts have only limited power with which to make judicial
demands upon the prosecuting office. When faced with a state refusal to
reinstate the original plea bargain, some courts have held that a presumption
of vindictiveness should apply to any offer that involves a greater sentence
than the defendant would have received under the original offer.147 This
presumption means that after a successful appeal, the state cannot refuse to
reinstate the original plea offer unless it first overcomes a judicial presumption that the refusal is the result of vindictiveness due to the defendant's
successful appeal. This presumption places a high standard upon the state to

144. State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d
722 (Wis. 1985); Commonwealth v. Copeland, 554 A.2d 54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Wilson, 724
S.W.3d 72.
145. Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp. at 1125; Lewandowski, 754 F. Supp. at 1150; Tucker
v. Holland, 327 S.E.2d 388, 396 (W.Va. 1985).
146. It is true that the state has unnecessarily expended its resources in conducting the trial and
those resources cannot be recouped. That concern, however, cannot justify the position that a
defendant in these cases should receive no remedy. Present day law embraces several situations
in which the state will expend its resources in conducting a trial, only later to have the
conviction overturned through no fault of its own. A grievous error committed by defense
counsel during the trial, for instance, will be the basis for reversing the first conviction and
ordering a new trial, thus inflicting additional expenditure of resources on the state. Yet, to
date, conservation of state resources has not been accepted as a justification for refusing to give
such a defendant a remedy for that injury. Therefore, the same concern should not justify a
refusal to remedy the injury in Alvernaz and Pollard type cases. This is especially true if that
remedy is the reinstatement of the lost plea bargain, since such a remedy calls for no additional
expenditure of state resources.
147. Turner, 940 F.2d at 1002.
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prove that there is some compelling reason, aside from animosity for the
defendant, which justifies its refusal to reinstate the lost plea bargain.
Whether application of this presumption is proper, however, is uncertain in
light of the directions from the United States Supreme Court when it
remanded Turner for consideration of Alabama v. Smith."'
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a presumption of vindictiveness
should not attach when a defendant receives a more severe punishment upon
retrial after he had successfully attacked his earlier guilty plea.149 Thus,
the Smith case centered on judicial vindictiveness. This fact led the latest
Turner court to conclude that Smith does not apply to a situation like Turner
where the concern is one of prosecutorialvindictiveness."s Accordingly,
the Turner court ruled that the presumption of vindictiveness should apply
whenever the state refuses to reinstate the lost plea bargain.
In contrast to Turner, the Pollard court refused to mandate the
presumption of vindictiveness, and applied a much lower standard.152
Pollardstated that the prosecution may withdraw the offer if they are able
to articulate, to the trial court's satisfaction, a reasonable basis for such
withdrawal. 53 The court did not, however, clearly define the boundaries
forming a reasonable basis for the withdrawal of the offer."s It merely
stated that the basis for a refusal may involve matters relating to the
defendant, the crime charged, or the internal policies of the prosecuting
office. 155 The only clear inference from this broad language is that the
defendant's conviction at a fair trial will not, in itself, constitute a reasonable
basis for a refusal to offer the original plea. If the conviction alone could
provide such a basis, the remedy of reinstatement would be illusory since
every case which gets to the remedy issue at all necessarily involves a
previous conviction of the defendant at a fair trial. Thus, the state would
never be obligated to offer the defendant the original plea bargain, and the
actual remedy the defendant would receive would be the re-opening of the
plea bargaining process or a retrial if no new agreement could be reached.

148. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
149. Id. at 801.
150. Turner, 940 F.2d at 1002.
151. Id. Note that the Pollard court supported its decision not to apply the presumption of
vindictiveness by noting that the United States Supreme Court had remanded Turner in
consideration of People v. Smith. Pollard,282 Cal. Rptr. at 597. The Pollard court felt that
this act was a recognition by the high court that no presumption of vindictiveness should apply
in these cases. Id. Pollard was decided in July 1991, however, and the latest Turner decision
was issued in August 1991. In the latest Turner decision, the United States Court of Appeals
in Tennessee ruled that the presumption of vindictiveness should apply regardless of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Turner, 940 F.2d at 1002. Since the latest Turner
opinion was not available to the Pollard court, it is not known how it would have influenced the
Pollardcourt, and how it will influence courts in the future.
152. Pollard, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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This is clearly not what the Pollardcourt had in mind when it ruled that the
state should reinstate the original plea unless it could articulate a reasonable
basis for withdrawing it. The Pollardcourt went on to point out that if the
state is allowed to withdraw the offer, then the original conviction would be
reinstated without a new trial being conducted.
The fact that most courts have not given any detailed discussion of the
remedy issue in combination with the conflict existing among the few that
have, leads to the conclusion that there is no clear answer to the remedy
issue at present. That conclusion, along with the conflict between Alvernaz
and Pollardover the application of the Strickland test, suggests that without
additional guidance from high courts, district and appellate level courts will
continue to produce inconsistent and unpredictable decisions.
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN FAVOR OF POLL4RD

"[P]lea bargaining is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered it is to be encouraged. " " Since the United
States Supreme Court made this statement in 1971, plea bargaining has
proliferated throughout the country. It is now estimated that approximately
ninety percent of all criminal cases will be disposed of through plea
bargaining."5 7 Because that statistic represents only those cases where the
accused accepted the plea bargain,"' the number of plea bargains actually
offered should be higher, and a plea bargain is probably offered in nearly
every criminal case today. As the number of plea bargain offers increase,
so too does the probability that more and more courts will be faced with
situations where the accused claims to have lost a plea bargain due to
ineffective assistance of counsel. That prospect calls out for uniform rules
which can be applied by all courts in the future. Otherwise, incongruous
splits such as that within the California Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Alvernaz and Pollard, and the drastically different results which went along
with the split, are sure to resurface later in California and elsewhere. The
introduction to this Note asserted that when a defendant claims to have lost
a plea bargain due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court
must answer some very difficult questions." 9 An examination of the cases
presented in the preceding sections of this Note indicates that the answers
found in the Pollardline of cases should be favored. 6°
The first question faced by the courts in these situations is, by what
standard should the court judge the adequacy of counsel's performance at the
plea bargaining stage? Since the United States Supreme Court decided

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 5 (1988).
Id.
See supra Introduction.
Reference to the Pollard line of cases refers to Turner, Lewandowski, and Wilson.
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Strickland,"' every major decision dealing with the asserted ineffective
assistance of counsel in regard to the rejection of a plea bargain has judged

the adequacy of the attorney's performance through application of the
Strickland two-prong test."
The conflicting outcomes of Pollard and
Alvernaz show, however, that application of the test will not lead to
consistent results without judicial agreement on the answer to a second
difficult question: Does the loss of a favorable plea bargain due to
ineffective assistance of counsel inflict a constitutionally significant injury
under the Stricklandtest even though the defendant received a fair trial?
The first prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's
performance was objectively unreasonable." In Pollard and Alvernaz,
both panels of the Fourth Appellate District agreed that either a failure to
convey a plea bargain offer to a defendant, or a material misstatement by the
attorney regarding the terms of the offer, would constitute deficient
performance under this test. Additionally, every court which has been faced
with the Pollardor Alvernaz type of case has applied the first prong of the
Strickland test and reached the same conclusion. 64
The outcome reached by the courts is strongly supported by the
Strickland opinion itself. In Strickland the court stated that when a court
applies the first prong of the test, "the prevailing norms of practice as
reflected in the ABA standards and the like are to be used as guides to
determining what is reasonable professional assistance.""
Accordingly,
most courts have cited section 4-6.2 of the ABA's StandardsRelating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice to support the conclusion that such acts
constitute deficient performance by counsel. This section states that the
attorney has a duty to keep the client advised of all proposals which are
offered by the prosecutor.
Additionally, Rule 4-5.2 expressly states that
the accused, not the attorney, must make the final decision on matters
concerning plea bargains. 67 Thus, when a defendant proves that defense
counsel failed to communicate a plea bargain offer, or provided misinformation which led the defendant to reject the offer, the courts will likely find that
the first prong of the Strickland test has been met.
Since the application of the first prong of the Strickland test has not

161. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
162. Pollard, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 593; Turner, 664 F. Supp. at 1117; Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d at
725; Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 899 (7th Cir. 1986); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1,
2 (Ga. 1988); Wilson, 724 S.W.2d at73; State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987); Kraus, 397 N.W.2d at 673; Lewandowski, 754 F. Supp. at 1147. For discussion of the
Strickland test, see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
163. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Turner, 664 F. Supp. at 1121; Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d at 726; Duckworth, 793
F.2d at 902; Lloyd, 373 S.E.2d at 3; Wilson, 724 S.W.2d at 74; James, 739 P.2d at 1167.
165. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
166. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Rule 4-6.2(a)

(ABA 2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS].
167. Id. at Rule 4-5.2(a)(i).
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generated significant controversy, the answer to the second difficult question
is ultimately grounded in the application of the second prong of the
Strickland test. When the courts turn to the application of the prejudice
prong, both Alvernaz and Pollard indicate that the outcome will be less
predictable. To establish prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must
prove that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. 1"
As previously noted, the
Alvernaz court ruled that participation in a fair trial moots any claim by the
defendant who received ineffective assistance of counsel which led to the loss
of a favorable plea bargain.1" Conversely, the Pollardcourt ruled that a
defendant has established prejudice upon proof that but for counsel's errors,
it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have accepted the plea
bargain offer."7 The existing case law indicates that the Pollard approach
to prejudice has been more widely accepted by courts than the Alvernaz
approach. Turner, Wilson, and Lewandowski each provide substantial
support for the Pollardapproach to the prejudice prong. Conversely, the
Alvernaz test is not directly supported by any reported cases from California
or any other state. But, in light of the Alvernaz (and Bennett) decisions,
there still seems to be some doubt171as to how the California courts will handle
the prejudice issue in the future.
The fundamental difference between the two approaches toward prejudice
centers on how broadly the court interprets the purpose behind the Sixth
Amendment's right to assistance of counsel. In Alvernaz, the court took a
very narrow view of that right, suggesting that the sole purpose of the right
to effective assistance of counsel is to guarantee a fair trial. On the other
hand, the court in the Pollardline of cases took a broader view of that right,
holding that the purpose of the right is to ensure fairness in the prosecution
as a whole.
The wider interpretation of the right to effective assistance of counsel
finds some support in the Strickland opinion itself. In Strickland the Court
stated that, "[the] Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results."" The Court's
use of the words "adversarial system" rather than the word "trial" indicates
that the Court interpreted the right to effective assistance of counsel more
broadly than merely as a right to guarantee a "fair trial." Additionally, as
noted by the concurrence in Alvernaz, it can be argued that, "the right to a
fair trial is a separate Sixth Amendment guarantee independent from the right

168. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
169. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pollard.
171. This holds true in the other states where this issue has not been decided by the higher
courts.
172. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
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to effective assistance of counsel." 1" This argument finds support in the
structure and text of the Sixth Amendment itself.174 The amendment lists
several rights which seem to constitute the modem day notion of a "fair
trial." These include the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to an
impartial jury, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to have the
assistance of counsel. Clearly, each one of these rights must be protected,
and thus, if one is not met, the criminal defendant's constitutional rights have
been violated. Suppose, for example, a defendant receives a speedy and
public trial but the jury in that trial was not impartial. It is clear that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights have been violated. Thus, even though

the defendant did receive some of the protections contained in the Amendment, the court cannot and will not ignore the fact that one of the rights, the

right to have an impartial jury, has not been protected. Unquestionably, the
failure to protect that one right cannot be eradicated by the protection of all
of the other rights in the Amendment. Therefore, the conviction must be
overturned.
So, why does the same reasoning not apply in the Alvernaz and Pollard
type cases? In Alvernaz the court said that although the defendant failed to
receive "effective" assistance of counsel, and thus was denied one of the
rights listed in the Sixth Amendment, he was entitled to no relief because the
other rights guaranteed by the amendment were protected in the form of a
fair trial. This reasoning would only be logical if the rights listed in the
amendment were connected by the word 'or'. This is clearly not the case,
however, and it would be absurd to suggest such an interpretation. This
leads to the obvious conclusion that the Alvernaz decision incorrectly stands
for the idea that the violation of one constitutional right can be remedied by
the protection of others. If that were true, the United States Constitution
would be reduced to a meaningless scrap of paper.
In sum, the support from other jurisdictions for the Pollard prejudice
test, along with the inferences that can be drawn from the procedural history
of Turner, suggests that courts which decide these issues in the future will
likely favor the Pollard approach to prejudice over that employed in
Alvernaz.
The third question which the courts will face in the future is, what, if
any, is the proper remedy in these cases? As previously discussed, Alvernaz
and the unpublished Bennett decision, provide no authoritative guidance in
answering this question because both courts ruled that prejudice had not been
shown, and thus, any discussion of remedy in those cases is merely dicta.

173. Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (Work J., concurring).
174. The Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and a district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Additionally, of those cases which have reached the remedy issue, very few
have provided any detailed analysis on the issue.' 75 The courts which have
simply remanded for a new trial have not discussed their reasoning for so
doing, 76 and lately this type of remedy has come under criticism. In
Turner, for example, the court stated that, "when ineffective assistance of
counsel results in the lost chance to accept a favorable plea bargain, simply
The point Turner makes is
remanding for a new trial is meaningless."'
valid since a new trial does not in any way compensate the defendant for his
lost opportunity to accept the plea bargain. In most cases, a new trial will
be a waste of time because the defendant has already been given one fair
trial, and there is no reason why another fair trial would turn out any
differently. Thus, fairness to the defendant and judicial economy would both
seem to support reinstatement of the lost bargain as the appropriate remedy
in these cases.
However, an order to reinstate the original plea bargain will not be well
received by the prosecutors. They will likely argue that because the
defendant has been convicted after a fair trial, the defendant is guilty of the
crime and thus deserves the sentence imposed by the court rather than the
lighter sentence connected to the lost plea bargain. At first glance this
argument seems logical, but in reality it fails to focus on the state's
knowledge at the relevant time period. The reviewing court must look to
what the prosecutor knew at the time the plea bargain was offered, not to
what the prosecutor knows after conviction." 8 At the time that a state
makes a plea bargain offer, it must have some incentive for wanting to avoid
resolution of the case at trial. Irrespective of whether the state made the
offer out of fear that it would lose at trial, or whether it merely wanted to
resolve one of the many cases awaiting trial, the fact remains that the state
made the offer. Since it made the offer, the state, based on its knowledge
at the time, was obviously willing to have the defendant accept it. If the plea
bargain is not reinstated and a new trial is ordered, prosecuting attorneys will
have no incentive to offer the defendant any plea bargain at all. They will
have every reason to be confident that they will convict the defendant at the
second fair trial, just as they had at the first fair trial.
When assessing the remedy issue, it is important to remember that the
error in these cases is not "society's" error, not the state's error, and not the
defendant's error. Nonetheless, one or more of these parties will have to
suffer because of that error. If a reinstatement of the plea bargain is

175. See supra Section IV.
176. See, e.g., Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 493; Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d 722; Copeland, 554 A.2d 54;
Wilson, 724 S.W.3d 72.
177. Turner, 664 F. Supp. at 1126.
178. Id. ("objective evidence supporting a non-vindictive increase in a plea offer should be
based on new facts or evidence that are not direct fruits of the previous ... trial, were unknown
at the time of the previous offer, and were discovered by means either independent of
information gained from the first trial or at least the product of inevitable discovery").
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ordered, "society" will suffer because a guilty person will be allowed back
into the community prematurely. Additionally, the state will suffer if
reinstatement is ordered by losing a valid conviction and by having a guilty
defendant get a lighter sentence than is deserved. On the other hand, if a
new trial is ordered, the defendant would suffer by facing a sentence after a
second fair trial which is not likely to be any different from the sentence
imposed after the first fair trial. These competing interests must be balanced
by the court. However, since the defendant's loss involves the total
deprivation of his freedom, the court will be hard-pressed to justify any
remedy other than reinstatement of the original plea bargain. The interests
of "society" and the state, while conceded to be very serious, can hardly
compete with the unconstitutional deprivation of a person's freedom.
The additional issue needing resolution if the courts opt for the remedy
of reinstatement is whether to apply a presumption of vindictiveness to any
subsequent plea bargain which is more severe than the original plea bargain.
The reasoning which supports the remedy of reinstatement also supports the
imposition of the presumption of vindictiveness. If the courts look to the
circumstances which existed at the time of the offer, they should rule that
any offer more severe than the original offer must be the product of the
prosecutor's post-conviction awareness that the defendant is guilty of the
crime. Absent the discovery of new evidence against the defendant, there is
no other reasonable explanation for the state's sudden refusal to offer a plea
bargain that it had previously offered to that very defendant. In order to
protect the defendant from being unjustly denied the plea bargain which he
would have accepted with the aid of effective counsel, the courts should
require the state to prove that the more severe offer is not the product of
prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Turner court stated that the presumption
of vindictiveness is rebutted by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's
action. 7 9 This requirement would also further judicial economy in that it
would encourage the state to comply with the appellate court's order before
attempting to withhold the plea bargain absent a tenable reason for doing so.
Additionally, without the requirement, the state might be tempted to leverage
the defendant into succumbing to a heavier sentence. This could be
accomplished if the state refused to reinstate the plea bargain, with no
objective reasons for doing so, thus leaving the burden on the defendant to
seek additional assistance from the courts. Practically speaking, this strategy
poses a realistic threat to a defendant who is still incarcerated on the original
conviction. Such a defendant is faced with all of the disadvantages inherent
in pursuing further judicial assistance from jail.
CONCLUSION

This Note has discussed the issues presented by claims that ineffective

179. Id. (quoting Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 32 n.6 (1984)).
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assistance of counsel has led to a loss of a favorable plea bargain. While the
case law is relatively scarce in this area, the existing law suggests that such
a claim should entitle a defendant to a reinstatement of the lost plea bargain,
provided that the ineffectiveness is proven under the Pollard application of
the Stricklandtest. Additionally, to further judicial economy and discourage
prosecutorial retribution, the courts should require the state to overcome a
presumption of vindictiveness if it wishes to withdraw that offer.
The conflict between Alvernaz and Pollardindicates, however, that these
issues are not so easily resolved by the appellate courts in California. This
conflict is likely due to the logical and moral dilemma which these types of
cases present to the parties involved. The prosecutors in these cases would
no doubt abhor the notion of being forced to give a lenient plea bargain
sentence to a guilty defendant convicted at a fair trial. On the other hand,
the defendants in these cases would be horrified at having to suffer a harsher
sentence through an unremedied violation of their constitutional rights.
These two competing interests are at the heart of the conflict, and unfortunately, there is no single remedy which will serve them both. When faced
with this situation the courts must consider the consequences of favoring one
of these interests over the other. Existing case law, as well as the United
States Constitution itself, indicate that the interest of the defendant must
prevail over the interest of the state in these cases."r°
Todd R. Falzone*

180. This Note has focused exclusively on the rights and remedies available to a defendant
seeking restitution in the criminal law courts. There are also, however, civil remedies available
to a defendant in these cases in the form of professional malpractice actions against the attorney.
See Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Attorney's Liability for Malpractice in Connection with
Defense of Criminal Case, 53 A.L.R.3d 731 (1973). Additionally, the attorney in these types
of cases could face disciplinary proceedings by the state bar for failure to communicate a plea
bargain offer to the accused. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 166, at Rule
4-6.2 (an attorney has an affirmative duty to advise the accused of all proposals made by the
prosecutor in regard to plea bargaining).
* I would like to thank Coleen M. Cusack and Victor J. Cosentino for their hard work and
guidance in the writing and editing of this Note. Additionally, I would like to dedicate this Note
with love and affection to Mom, Dad, and Christine. Your love and support means more to me
than words can say.
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